Here is something that I've more or less written about before, but Iwant to reinforce by saying explicitly:

Asking users questions never increases security.

Never ever. Really.

(See SecurityChoiceProblem for a discussion of why.)

What this means is simple. Every time you design a system where part ofthe design is 'if something questionable happens, we will ask the userif they approve it', assume that at least half of your users will makethe wrong choice. Ask yourself what this does to

As I alluded to in a comment here ,one reason that we can't expect people to understand that 'low qualityencryption' is basically 'no encryption' is that browsers don't. In factthe issue shows why having a distinct and specially marked 'https' isultimately a terrible mistake; it has trained programmers and users thathttps means security, when in fact it doesn't.

What would have been much better is if browsers hid the differencebetween the raw protocol being used and instead showed

My perspective is that I have always had a two-fold interest inOpenSolaris. One part of my interest was actually in Solaris sourcecode (for which OpenSolaris was the closest available substitute),and the other part was an alternative to Solaris if Sun went crazy.

I never truly trusted OpenSolaris for two reasons. First, because Inever fully trusted the depth of Sun's commitment to open source; italways felt like a tactical move, instead of a heartfelt conviction,and tactical moves are subject to revocation