Suppose that you have a system that you are not entirely confidantof, and you want to look to see if bits of it have been modified fromstock. The easiest way is to use your packaging system's verificationsupport , but let us suppose that your packagesystem doesn't have support for this (or at least that the support isoptional and not installed at the moment).

If you happen to have another theoretically identical system lyingaround (as we do), you can do a crude system

One of the many problems of SSL, especially on the web, is thatit gets its idea of identity wrong (in practice, in actualimplementations). SSL's version of identity is all tied to abstruse X.509 things, all CN and O andOU and so on, but on the real Internet, users don't think of identitythat way; they think of identity as websites, or more exactly of somepersonal label that they have for the entity that stands behind awebsite

In theory, what is guaranteed in a language is the things that arein its (official) specification; if the specification is silent orsays that something is not guaranteed, it isn't, regardless of howimplementations behave.

More and more I have come to believe that this is mistaken, and that inpractice what is guaranteed in a language is what programmers code to,regardless of what the specification says. This is because of simplepragmatics: a new implementation that does not run most of the existingcode