Many systems seem to be not really designed for a long term storagemanagement environment . Instead they seem toopt for a kind of planned obsolescence approach where they assume thatyou will buy them, run them more or less into the ground without reallychanging or upgrading anything, and then replace them wholesale in abig, painful, user-visible bang.

From the perspective of a long term storage management environment this is a crazy thing to do; with no growth and thus no future, thesesystems are basically closed boxes

In theory we can separate the ideas of identity and authorization,and it is common to present complex computer systems this way. Inpractice I think that many people blur the two together and attemptingto forcefully separate them only leads to confused users and frustratedsecurity people.

I believe that one reason for this is because we rarely think ofpeople alone in the real world; instead we think of them with attachedassociations. It is not 'Chris Siebenmann, who is authorized to', it is'Chris Siebenmann who works

This week, we:

• got 11,905 messages from 252 different IP addresses.
• handled 27,710 sessions from 2,367 different IP addresses.
• received 342,122 connections from at least 124,401 different IPaddresses.
• hit a highwater of 36 connections being checked at once.

Connection volume seems up a bit from last week ,although it's hard to be entirely sure. Session volume is definitelyup,

I'm in the process of getting a new test server installed in a rackin our machine room. This means we needed to set up some networkconnections for it, which involved someone dragging yet more cablearound our machine room and finding switch ports to plug into to getthe necessary networks (which turned out not to be an entirely trivialthing).

As a result, the whole thing got me thinking about the issue of the bestway to get all of your networks to where they need to be in