Why we put alert start and end times in our Prometheus alert messages
As I mentioned in Formatting alert start and end times inAlertmanager messages , we put thealert start times and if applicable the alert end times in the(email) alert messages that we send out. Generally these looklike one of these two:
- for a current alert
(alert started at 15:16:02 EDT 2020-06-05, likely detected ~90s earlier)- for an alert that has ended
(alert active from 15:16:
Formatting alert start and end times in Prometheus Alertmanager messages
One of the things that you'll generally wind up doing with Prometheus 's Alertmanager is creatingcustom alert messages (in whatever medium you send alerts, whetherthat's email or something else). Alertmanager comes with some defaulttemplates for various alerting destinations, but they're very genericand not all that useful in many situations. If you're customizingalert messages, one thing you might want to put in is when thealerts started (and possibly when they ended, if you send messageswhen alerts
In theory you (we) should have SPF records for HELO hostnames too
Let's start with what I said in the Fediverse today :
Today I learned that you should have SPF records for your HELO names,not just for your MAIL FROM domains. I guess I have some DNS recordsto add now.
When I learned about SPF , back whenit was very new, I at least understood it as being about preventingforgery of SMTP envelope sender domains (ie, SMTP MAIL FROM domains).In modern usage, this is no longer the case; even the 'proposedstandard'
A subtle trap when formatting Go time.Time values
Let's say that you have a Go time.Time value, tstamp , that you happento know for sure was collected at 18:00 and some seconds (in yourtime zone). Now suppose that you use time.Time.Format() on tstamp to get astring form of its hours and minutes (using the format string "15:04" ). Will you always get the string '18:00' as the outputfrom formatting tstamp this way
Watching the recent AddTrust root CA certificate expiry has been humbling
The news of the recent past is that the old 'AddTrust ExternalCA Root' root certificate expired on May 30th (at 10:48:48 UTC). Before this happened, Iconfidently told more than one person that one reason I was confidentthat our TLS certificate environment wasn't affected by this wasthat our Prometheus based monitoring system specifically looks at all of the TLS certificates in a certificatevalidation chain, not just only the first ('leaf') certificate forthe server
Mail forwarding is slowly dying (probably)
Yesterday I wrote about the mechanics of us DKIM signing some ofour email , and mentioned that we're definitelynot signing email that merely passes through us, for example whenan outside person emails a person here and that person forwardstheir email elsewhere. Such mail forwarding is reasonably popular here ; a lot of people forwardtheir email to other places. Some of them have moved (by graduationor whatever), some of them prefer having their email elsewhere, andso on. We officially support this mail forwarding in
How we're likely to DKIM sign some of our email messages
For years, we have more or less deliberately not set up DKIM signingfor any of our outgoing email,for various reasons (see my current views on using DKIM here , from 2015). For various local reasons beyond the scopeof this entry, we may be about to change our view and start DKIMsigning some things.
The actual mechanics of configuring basic DKIM signing in Exim turn out to be pleasantly simple. Exim evendocuments the OpenSSL and GNU TLS commands that you need to run togenerate
What sort of SSH keys our users use or have listed in their authorized keys files
Yesterday I wrote about the surprisingly persistence of RSA keysin SSH in general terms. Today I'mgoing to make that concrete, by looking at what sorts of SSH keys our users have in theirauthorized_keys files and have used for authenticating to oursystems in 2020. Unsurprisingly, these turn out to be not quitethe same.
Based on some fairly brute force grep'ing of authorized_keysfiles, we have 729 people with authorized keys files that have(theoretically) live
The surprising persistence of RSA keys in SSH
Generally speaking, SSH the protocol and OpenSSH the leadingimplementation of it have (or have had) four different types ofSSH keys : RSA, DSA (which has now beendeprecated), ECDSA, and Ed25519, listed here in the order of whenthey were added to SSH (with Ed25519 being the most recent). SinceRSA is the oldest, you might reasonably expect that it was the leastused of the three that are still actively supported. Instead it
My various settings in X to get programs working on my HiDPI display
Back when I got my HiDPI display (a 27" Dell P2715Q), I wrote anentry about what the core practical problems with HiDPI seemedto be on Linux and talked in general terms aboutwhat HiDPI related settings were available but I never wrote aboutwhat specific things I was setting and where. Today I'm going toremedy this, partly for my own future use for the hopeful futureday when I need to duplicate this at work. Since I'm doing this two