Suppose that your ssh does not check host keys and an attacker has notso much successfully impersonated one of your machines as persuadedyou to connect to his machine instead of yours, without you knowing.How does the attacker 'win'?

We can see the obvious wins by what ssh turns off if you have StrictHostKeyChecking set to 'no' and a key fails to verify. First,the attacker wins immediately if they can get you to type your passwordto their ssh daemon, since they can just have their ssh

One of the things that I've seen repeatedly in anime is what I call'disposable first episodes'. The purest form of the disposable firstepisode is where nothing in the first episode is ever seen again; ittakes place in a location that the story never revisits, involvescharacters (apart from the protagonists) that we never see again, andthe events are never referred to or affect anything.

(The most recent pure form disposable first episode that I canremember is the first episode of D.Gray

For some reason, people have an enduring like for new schemes foremail where the sender stores the message until the recipient wants toread it (the most well known is D. J. Bernstein's Internet Mail 2000 ). Such schemes tend to handwave the socialproblems involved in a transition, but let's set that aside (alongwith why they won't stop spam ) and talk aboutthe practical technical problems, because from my perspective they arepretty bad.

If the sender stores

(This idea is not from me, it's from R Francis Smith . It is just sufficiently nifty and wrong thatI'm going to write it up for posterity.)

Suppose that you have a generic hostname, a hostname that either ismultiple machines (with multiple IP addresses) or a virtual host thatgets pointed to different physical machines from time to time. Furthersuppose that inside your environment, your users ssh to that machine,or at least want to. The traditional problem with this is that