MOSCOW -- On the morning of Aug. 16, a contingent of Taliban fighters and two armored vehicles equipped with machine guns surrounded the Russian Embassy in Kabul. Their mission: to protect the Russian diplomatic personnel inside.
As Russia's Ambassador to Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov told the Echo Moskva radio station later that day, a Taliban commander promised him that "no one will harm a hair on the heads of Russian diplomats." In a sharp contrast from the tone of his Western counterparts, Zhirnov described the Taliban soldiers as "very adequate people" and praised the Islamist group for quickly restoring order in Kabul.
This would have been inconceivable 20 years ago, when Russia and the Taliban were sworn enemies. Now, after returning to power in August, the Taliban is openly courting Moscow and there are at least some signs Russia is prepared to reciprocate.
Russian analysts told Nikkei Asia that Moscow is putting the Taliban on "probation" to see whether it can keep promises to combat drug traffickers and more radical extremist groups.
Senior Taliban officials regularly describe Russia as a potential ally, along with China and Pakistan. In an interview last month with Russian news agency RIA Novosti, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid urged Russia to become a "new mediator" between the group and the United Nations, while inviting Russian companies to launch new economic projects in Afghanistan.
Russia, for its part, invited the Taliban to Moscow last Wednesday for international talks on Afghanistan with representatives from China, India, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian republics. Although the discussions did not produce any blockbuster deals, the Taliban framed them as a diplomatic success.
"It was a very good meeting, in a very friendly atmosphere," Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, who led the group's delegation to Moscow, told reporters afterward. "The Taliban appreciates and welcomes the initiative of the Russian Federation."
At the same time, however, senior Russian officials emphasized that Moscow is no rush to recognize the Taliban's rule, citing concerns over a lack of representation for ethnic and religious minorities in the group's interim government. Experts also paint a picture of complex Central Asian security challenges for the Kremlin -- underscored by a Russian military buildup in Central Asia in recent months, along with numerous drills near Afghanistan's northern border.
"The situation in Afghanistan is very uncertain and no one knows what will happen tomorrow," said Andrei Kazantsev, a professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. "Even putting aside the Taliban, a lot can happen -- for example a hunger crisis breaks out and the country starts to collapse. That's why Russia has [mobilized] all the necessary resources to guarantee the security of itself and its Central Asian allies."
Still, as Russia and the Taliban attempt to move beyond their deeply troubled past, their evolving relationship could influence the future of Afghanistan and the surrounding region.
Russian, Kazakh and Belarusian soldiers line up during drills under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation banner near the Tajik-Afghan border on Oct. 23. Russia has led numerous exercises in the region in recent months. © Reuters Moscow's difficult history with the Taliban began even before the group first seized power in 1996, years after the Soviet Union's ill-fated war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.
On Aug. 3, 1995, Taliban forces intercepted a Russian Ilyushin-76 plane over Afghanistan and forced it to land at Kandahar. Upon inspection, the Taliban discovered that the aircraft was carrying 30 tons of ammunition intended for the Northern Alliance -- an anti-Taliban coalition with broad international backing. The Ilyushin's seven Russian crew members were arrested and held hostage for 378 days, until they managed to perform a daring jailbreak, retake control of their plane and escape to the United Arab Emirates.
Tensions between Russia and the Taliban continued to worsen over the next several years. The Taliban provided safe haven to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a militant Uzbek group that carried out attacks against Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan -- all Russian allies -- between 1999 and 2001. Even more significantly for the Kremlin, the Taliban began sending weapons and money to Islamist rebels in Chechnya, a Muslim-majority region in southern Russia. In January 2000, the Taliban formally recognized Chechnya's independence, and shortly thereafter, the group's official newspaper Sharia called upon all Muslim countries to declare holy war against Russia.
Upon taking office, Russian President Vladimir Putin adopted a hard line against the Taliban. In March 2000, senior Kremlin officials warned the Taliban that Russia was prepared to conduct airstrikes against Chechen training camps in Afghanistan.
Following the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., Putin quickly threw his support behind the American campaign in Afghanistan -- ordering Russian security services to share intelligence, allowing Washington to use Russian airspace for delivering supplies to Afghanistan, and even greenlighting the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia. In 2003, the Russian Supreme Court designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization banned from operating on Russian soil.
Time may not have healed these wounds, but the dynamics changed.
The Kremlin grew increasingly frustrated with the U.S. over Afghanistan's booming opium production, much of which was smuggled into Russia through Central Asia. Then came the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the Russian annexation of Crimea, after which Washington imposed sanctions against Moscow.
"In this situation, I think it's quite possible that for the Russian leadership, the threats associated with the U.S. became greater than the threats coming from Afghanistan," Kazantsev said.
Further complicating matters was the emergence of ISIS-Khorasan, an affiliate of the Islamic State group, in northern Afghanistan. By 2018, Russian officials estimated that ISIS-K had over 10,000 fighters in the country. With its emphasis on global jihad, the group surpassed the Taliban as the top threat in Afghanistan for Russia.
As priorities shifted, Russia established contacts with the Taliban in 2014. In November 2018, a Taliban delegation arrived in Moscow for the first time to attend Russian-led Afghanistan peace talks. Since then, Taliban representatives have visited the Russian capital seven times, including four this year alone. In early July, the visiting Taliban reportedly promised to crack down on drug trafficking and to prevent other extremist groups from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against Russia or its Central Asian partners.
Just over a month later, a triumphant Taliban marched into Kabul after 20 years of war. While Western governments rushed to evacuate their diplomatic personnel and citizens, Russia announced that its embassy in Kabul would stay open. At the same time, Russian officials expressed cautious optimism about the new government in Afghanistan. On Aug. 28, the Kremlin's special envoy on Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, declared that the Taliban's early actions showed the group had "learned certain lessons from history."
Some Russian analysts contend that Moscow was far less enthused than its public statements suggested. Andrei Serenko, head of the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan, told Nikkei that although Russia had long expected the government of President Ashraf Ghani to fall, it hoped the replacement would be a coalition including "longtime friends" of Moscow such as former President Hamid Karzai and prominent figures from Afghanistan's Tajik and Uzbek communities.
"Moscow actively played along with the Taliban, but that does not mean it wanted to see them back in power," Serenko said. "It's one thing to use the Taliban as part of a game against the United States in the region, and another to have an Islamist, jihadist regime on the border of Central Asia -- Russia's soft underbelly."
The head of the Taliban's delegation to Moscow, Abdul Salam Hanafi, speaks with journalists during international talks on Afghanistan on Oct. 20. © Reuters For Moscow, the early returns are mixed. While the Taliban has made diplomatic inroads with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it has also exchanged barbs with Tajikistan. In recent weeks, the Taliban has denounced Dushanbe for sheltering Afghan resistance leaders and deployed thousands of troops, reportedly including suicide bombers from the elite Lashkar-i-Mansuri battalion, to its northern border.
Nevertheless, Russia has vocally opposed treating the Taliban government as a global pariah. In early September, Putin urged the international community to unfreeze Afghanistan's central bank reserves, restore financial aid programs for the country and gradually welcome the Taliban into "the civilized family of nations." Such measures, the Russian leader argued, were necessary to prevent the "disintegration" of Afghanistan.
"There is a danger that the lack of funds in the treasury of Afghanistan could push those who control the country today to make money on the sale of drugs and weapons, as it was the case last time, but now there are also weapons worth billions of dollars that were abandoned by the Americans," Putin said.
Kazantsev argued Russia has little choice but to try to establish a working relationship with the Taliban. "The West can afford to completely distance itself from the Afghan situation," he said. "That's not an option Russia has since it needs to ensure its own security along with those of its Central Asian allies."
What are Russia's options for achieving that? Serenko suggested one potential strategy would be to try cultivating a "pro-Russian party" within the Taliban. Despite the lack of a diplomatic breakthrough, he noted that the Taliban's visit to Moscow last Wednesday could provide Russia with a valuable opportunity to strengthen ties with the group's political wing.
If diplomacy falls short, Russia is prepared to deter the Taliban through other means.
Since April, Russia has conducted regular exercises with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan near the Afghan border. The drills have featured thousands of troops and hundreds of units of equipment, from planes to tanks. At the same time, Moscow has reinforced its 201st base in Tajikistan -- its largest facility in Central Asia -- with new weapons and hardware, including sniper rifles, armored vehicles and missile systems.
Gen. Alexander Lapin, commander of Russia's Central Military District, told reporters in early August that the exercises were a response to "increasing aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan and the threat of penetration by radical terrorist groups bordering the Central Asian countries."
Some former top military officials offered a more blunt assessment of the drills' target audience. Days after the fall of Kabul, retired Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff from 2004 to 2007, argued that the border exercises were meant to send a clear message to the Taliban about Russia's military capabilities.
"If you followed the exercises in Uzbekistan, you will have noticed that long-range Tu-22M3 bombers were used there," he told RIA Novosti. "These planes are not intended to support ground forces, but to deliver long-range strikes against targets. They are a warning to the Taliban not to approach the borders."
Kabul on Oct. 21: Russian experts warn the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan could embolden other extremist groups. © Reuters Yet, Russia's fears are not limited to potential Taliban incursions into Central Asia.
Georgi Asatryan, a professor at Plekhanov Russian University of Economics and Moscow State University, warned that the Taliban's triumph could embolden extremist groups across the post-Soviet space and beyond.
"The Taliban's victory, which was so dramatic and decisive, has become a business plan for international terrorist groups," he said. "The Taliban doesn't necessarily support these groups and may even fight against them, but the Taliban's return to power has undoubtedly provided them with a powerful source of inspiration."