TOKYO -- Two decades have passed since Japan's government ministries and agencies were reorganized into their current structure. Since 2001, the old bottom-up way of policymaking has been replaced with the prime minister's office taking the lead, with far less involvement from ruling party officials. Known as the kantei , the prime minister's office is now the single most powerful institution in the country.

"I personally will take the lead in implementation," said Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on May 7, when the government set a goal of performing one million coronavirus vaccinations per day.

The prime minister was true to his word as regards implementation. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare had no intention of setting such a target and Taro Kono, the minister in charge of regulatory reform and vaccinations, was skeptical that the goal could be achieved. Contrary to low expectations, the goal was easily achieved in June.

The history of the kantei in determining policy can be divided into three main periods: the 1990s, when the new system was designed; the 2000s, when it was implemented; and the period following former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's December 2012 victory, during which the kantei become the preeminent government body.

Prior to that, Japanese politics was represented by the "iron triangle," comprised of politicians, the bureaucracy and industry. Lawmakers of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party fell into different "policy tribes" broken down by industry or sector, such as agriculture and social security. Together with the ministries and industries, they wielded considerable influence in policymaking.

But after the Recruit insider trading scandal in 1988, the triangle fractured. The scandal saw unlisted shares of stock distributed to members of different political parties, many of who profited when the shares went public.

Fierce criticism of money in politics arose after the scandal, putting scrutiny on the electoral system's multiple-seat constituencies, in which candidates from the same party would run against each other. Every faction in the LDP tried to have its candidates elected, and the heated competition made campaigning more expensive.

This prompted the LDP to embrace electoral reform and introduce single-seat constituencies, which in effect limit each district to one candidate per party. This new system made the party leader more powerful while weakening the influence of factions.

Following the changes to the electoral system, then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto changed the structure of government. In 1996, he proposed that budgeting, personnel decisions and administrative management should be the purview of the kantei. This change came into effect in 2001. The newly created Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office provided venues to consolidate the policymaking functions of government agencies and the ruling parties.

Junichiro Koizumi of the LDP, who became prime minister in 2001, greatly benefited from the revamped system. The newly established Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, chaired by the prime minister, became the main arena for policymaking, with Heizo Takenaka, an economics professor at the time, as the minister in charge. The kantei then secured its grip on the decision-making process by creating the Basic Policy for Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform, which to this day serves as the guiding force for economic and fiscal policy.

One of the best examples of this shift was the privatization of the postal service, one of Koizumi's major goals. Koizumi referred to opposition within his ruling LDP as "resistance forces." In the 2005 general election, he refused to approve any LDP candidates in local elections who opposed postal privatization. Instead, he threw his support behind others more in line with his thinking, who were referred to as Koizumi's "assassins." Making full use of the new electoral system, he leveraged the kantei to win the power struggle within the LDP.

To fully understand how the kantei came to be what it is today, one must look at the governments under the Democratic Party of Japan from 2009 to 2012. The DPJ, which wrested power from the LDP on its platform of shifting leadership to politicians, created the National Policy Unit under the direct control of the kantei to centralize policymaking. It also created a council in which ministers and vice-ministers could decide important issues on their own.

However, it did not function well. DPJ politicians were unable to effectively control the bureaucracy, and the prime minister failed to fully exercise leadership.

This was best characterized by the process in which the consumption tax was raised. The DPJ was comprised of politicians originally from the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and other parties with disparate policy principles. In 2012, then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda set the stage for an increase in the consumption tax, but opponents of the move within the DPJ left the party in droves. In December that year, the DPJ was overwhelmingly defeated in the lower house election.

With Abe back in the kantei, many in the ruling coalition felt that the weakness shown by the DPJ had disappointed voters, prompting a search for leadership within the kantei.

This time, however, the kantei was different from during the Koizumi administration: Policymaking did not start with the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. Instead, it came from Abe and his inner circle. Along with then-Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, policymaking was initiated by a small number of bureaucrats, including Abe's chief secretary, Takaya Imai.

Abe went on to lead the LDP to six consecutive victories in national elections. Given this success, party members could hardly question leadership.

In 2014, the Cabinet Personnel Bureau was created to manage the appointment of senior officials in each ministry and agency, and the last piece of Hashimoto's reforms, "personnel affairs," fell into place.

How has the kantei fared under the Suga administration?

Although Suga inherited a powerful institution in the kantei, differences have emerged. While Abe emphasized policies based on broad principles and ideals like constitutional reform and national security, Suga has been more focused on stand-alone policies, like cutting greenhouse gas emissions, setting up a digital agency, lowering mobile phone fees, and treating infertility.

The main actors are also different. Suga does not rely on a small group of bureaucrats like Abe did with Imai, who was from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Aso and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu rarely assume leadership roles. Instead, the prime minister gives direct orders to cabinet ministers like Kono and Ryota Takeda, the minister of internal affairs and communications, to push individual policies.

But the power of the kantei, which once seemed unshakable, is showing signs of vulnerability. For example, local governments now have the authority to request restaurants to cut operating hours during the pandemic after the central government decided on the basic policy. It has also become clear that the kantei cannot be relied on to secure hospital beds, vaccinations and public health centers.

Until now, the leadership of the kantei has been discussed in terms of the relationship between the government and the ruling party, or the government and the ministries. But if Japan is to handle crisis situations, the next focus will be on the kantei and its role between national and local governments.

Japan has so far promoted decentralization. By delegating authority to local governments, Tokyo lets them set their own policies.

However appealing this is in normal times, this risks the national government and local governments being out of step should another crisis arise. After 20 years, the search for a new model of governance has begun.

Inside Japanese Politics is a column that focuses on the details and inner workings of Tokyo statecraft, policy and foreign relations.